Book Review THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDAHAR

THE UNEXPECTED WAR: CANADA IN KANDAHAR

by Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang

(Viking Canada, 304 pages, $35 hardcover)

In July 2002, not long after he became Canada's defence minister, John McCallum visited Kabul, travelling about in a Romanian military vehicle. The Canadian troops were weeks from going home after a six-month rotation and their vehicles had already been shipped home.

The mission had been relatively uneventful, but four Canadians had been killed when an U.S. reservist dropped a laser-guided bomb on them. Canada had fulfilled its obligations, however, and was ending its involvement in Afghanistan.

But then in early 2003, as the United States prepared to invade Iraq, it needed to reduce its commitments in Afghanistan. Canada agreed to take command of the International Security Assistance Force, a commitment that required more than 2,000 troops for 12 months. So it returned to Afghanistan. That mission suffered three deaths.

As it ended in 2004, Canada agreed next to participate in the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) program established in Afghanistan by the United Nations late in 2001. A small military force was to support a host of development programs. The Canadians were sent to Kandahar -- home of the Taliban, but at that time relatively peaceful.

The reconstruction program fit perfectly with Ottawa's new 3D policy -- defence, diplomacy, development -- for international involvement. But as Kandahar became increasingly violent, defence priorities began to outweigh diplomacy and development.

And according to authors Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, Canada "slipped into war in Afghanistan, step by step, incrementally, without understanding that it was going to war, until it woke up to mounting casualties and grim battles."

In The Unexpected War, this military narrative is in the background. The authors focus instead on Ottawa's decision-making and policy development. Stein is director of the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto. Lang is a retired chief of staff to McCallum and to Bill Graham, another Liberal defence minister. Their book is analytical and highly critical.

"Peacekeeping" in the 21st century has changed at a very basic level, the authors say, and Afghanistan sets an example for future missions focusing on "peace building."

Understanding our Afghan policy, they assert, is essential to adapting to this change.

According to the authors, Canada is doing almost everything wrong -- with the exception of the performance by our troops. And the problem, they say, lies with the decision-making process in Ottawa.

McCallum, for example, became defence minister due to the Adscam scandal and the ongoing Liberal leadership quarrel between Jean Chr?tien and Paul Martin. The previous minister, Art Eggleton, had been dismissed for questionable contracting practices in an attempt to counter attacks regarding Adscam. His replacement could not be an MP suspected of supporting the Martin leadership camp, so the job fell to a surprised McCallum, an economist who admits he knew nothing about the military.

Personality was another factor in the bad decision-making. As prime minister, Martin earned the moniker "Mr. Dithers" and, according to the authors, "this style led to a sclerotic, constipated decision-making process that is still the stuff of legend in Ottawa."

Into this vacuum strode General Rick Hillier, new chief of the defence staff and a man who was intelligent, articulate and accustomed to the forceful decision-making process of the military.

The situation "unbalanced the relationship between civilian and military," Stein and Lang say. The tail was now wagging the dog.

Canada's role in Afghanistan was also influenced by the Ottawa-Washington nexus. Our commitment there was seen as balancing our refusal to join the invasion of Iraq and the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence program.

The problem, Stein and Lang observe, is that Canada could have refused all three initiatives, not just two of them.

"We grossly overstate our importance in Washington. They really don't care much about us," the authors say.

Most significantly, the book asserts, our 3D policy and our new model of peace building are hindered by cultural differences -- not between the Pashto people of Kandahar province and Canadian troops, but among our own institutions. The 3D approach requires co-operation by the Canadian Forces, Department of Foreign Affairs and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). But these three have different mandates, outlooks and operating procedures. They have never been asked to work in concert before.

Resolving "the endless bickering and the institutional quarrels" is the key to the future, the authors say. They also conclude that only a long-term commitment will have an impact on Afghanistan's development. A short-term, incremental commitment offers no solution while continuing to put Canadian lives at risk.

Unfortunately, the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper remains wedded to short-term solutions. In 2006 Canada's mission to Afghanistan was extended to 2009 and early in 2008 that extension was extended to 2011. It would seem that the government and the bureaucracy in Ottawa have not read this book.

שטח סגור | Closed Zone 1 | منطقة مغلقة

שטח סגור | Closed Zone | منطقة مغلقة

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Closed Zone, Part 2

Gideon Levy is one of the few writers to not have fallen head over heels in love with Waltzing with Bashir, Ari Folman's animated,surrealistic documentary of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and its lasting effects on those who perpetrated it. Writing in Ha'aretz he describes the film as “stylish, sophisticated, gifted and tasteful - but propaganda.” Propoganda in that it focuses on the perpetrators, the invaders, and the impact of the war on them while neglecting to consider, at least on a human level, the victims, the Palestinian refugees that were massacred by the Falange proceeding with an Israeli green light and star shells and illumination rounds aiding them in their search for victims.

Levy continues: "Then, suddenly, the illustrations give way to the real shots of the horror of the women keening amid the ruins and the bodies. For the first time in the movie, we not only see real footage, but also the real victims. Not the ones who need a shrink and a drink to get over their experience, but those who remain bereaved for all time, homeless, limbless and crippled. No drink and no shrink can help them. And that is the first (and last) moment of truth and pain in Waltz with Bashir."

Levy's criticism of the film may be inspired by events far more recent than Sabra and Shatila. On the day that Folman accepted his Oscar, Israeli forces were relentlessly pounding Gaza.

Folman chose to remain silent. As Israeli rockets, bombs, tanks and artillery created scenes reminiscent of Beirut in 1982 Folman choose to draw no parallels. That was less honest than anything in his film.

It also compels one to draw attention to another member of the team that produced Waltzing with Bashir. Yoni Goodman was animation director on the film. He recently produced a short animated film for Gisha--Legal Center for Freedom of Movement. An organization that "calls on the State of Israel to fully open Gaza's crossings and to allow the real victims of the closure - 1.5 million human beings - the freedom of movement necessary to realize their dreams and aspirations." Closed Zone illustrates the consequences of Israel's illegal closure of Gaza. There is a link to it above.

Afghanistan by the Numbers

Civilian Casualties

1. Number of people currently displaced in Afghanistan, according to estimates by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR):235,000
2. Number of civilian deaths in Afghanistan in 2008 according to the United Nations (UN): 2,118
3. Increase in civilian deaths from 2007 according to the UN: 40%
4. Projected civilian deaths in Afghanistan (at 40% rate of increase) in 2009: 2,965*

Coalition Casualties

1. Coalition Military fatal casualties January, February, 2008: 21
2. Coalition Military fatal casualties January, February, 2009: 48
3. Change from January, February, 2008 to January, February, 2009: +129%
4. Coalition Military fatal casualties June-September, 2008: 159
5. Projected Coalition Military fatal casualties June-September, 2009 (at 129% rate of increase): 364*

Canadian Casualties

1. Number of Canadian forces fatal casualties in 2008: 32
2. Canadian Forces fatal combat casualties in January 2008: 1
3. Canadian Forces fatal combat casualties in January 2009: 2
4. Canadian Forces fatal combat casualties June-September, 2008: 14
5. Projected Canadian Forces casualties 2009 (at 129% rate of increase): 73*

Canadian Costs

1. Current monthly cost of Canada's involvement in Afghanistan: $200 million
2. Parliamentary Budget Officer Kevin Page's estimate of Afghanistan mission's total cost if it concludes in 2011: $13.9 - $18.1 billion
3. Cost per Canadian household: $1500
4. Proportion of mission's total cost dedicated to aid programs : 9-12%
5. Proportion of mission's total cost dedicated to military operations: 75%

If you are a Canadian and live alone, in a single-person household, you will have paid $1,125 to kill Afghanis by 2011.

*NB: the point of these forecasts is to give an indication of the terrible toll this occupation will exact; it is by no means presented in a callous fashion.

Unembedded: Two Decades of Maverick War Reporting

by Scott Taylor (Douglas & McIntyre,374 pages, $34.95 hardcover)

This review originally appeared in The Record February 28, 2009.

In early September 2002, journalists flocked to New York City to cover the first anniversary commemoration of the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. Following the road less travelled, Scott Taylor headed for Baghdad on a hunch, "that Bush might use the first anniversary of September 11, 2001, to send a message to Saddam."
The hunch proved wrong, but was typical of Taylor's unorthodox approach. In an era of "embedded" journalists who accompany troops with command approval, his style is more Raoul Duke than "Crusty" Blatchford.

The life journey that led Taylor to become publisher of Ottawa-based Esprit de Corps magazine has been no less unusual than his seat-of-the-pants reporting style.
In 1980 he was a student at the Ontario College of Art, playing drums in a punk band called The Offenders and anticipating a career as a graphic artist.

"When this scenario fully hit home," he writes, "I packed a small bag and headed straight to the nearest armed forces recruiting centre."

In 1988, on leaving the forces, Taylor established Esprit de Corps as "an inflight magazine for the Canadian air force" as it shuttled troops to Germany and across Canada. The Department of National Defence had complete control of the contents and prepublication approval rights. The magazine was heavy on illustrations, light on editorial content and relied on advertising revenue from companies seeking to promote products to service personnel.

Over the next eight years, Esprit de Corps shook off that editorial oversight and evolved into a beast that many commanders and bureaucrats wished they had never unleashed. Stories about crime and corruption in the highest ranks of the forces, coupled with issues titled "Sex in the Service" and "Scapegoat," established its reputation as the bette noir of the military brass and its publisher as the "voice of the grunt."

Taylor unconditionally supports the troops, but never hesitates to question the mission and machinations of desk jockeys, bureaucrats and politicians in Ottawa.
As the magazine evolved, he was also developing his unorthodox style of unembedded war reporting, predicated on a simple maxim: fly, drive or hitch a ride, but always "march to the sound of the guns."

Over the last 20 years, this approach has seen him make dozens of trips to the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. It has also given him the opportunity to frequently report from territory untouched by pool journalists and the mainstream media.
His book describes the 1993 Battle of the Medak Pocket, which involved Canadian troops in a shooting war with Croatian troops determined to eliminate the Serbian presence in the Krajina, an ethnic Serbian enclave in southern Croatia.
It was Canada's largest and most costly engagement since the Korean War and Taylor was the lone Canadian journalist there.

Discussing the Afghan conflict, Taylor recounts interviews with General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a key figure in the Northern Alliance during the war against the Taliban; with Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban government's last official spokesperson; and with Amrullah Saleh, head of the Afghan National Directorate of Security. In Iraq he interviewed Kurd and Turkmen leaders as well as sharing dinner and an off-the-record (at the time) discussion with Saddam Hussein's Minister of Defence, before the second Gulf War.

Taylor has paid a price for his courage and independent reportage. In September 2004, he was the unwilling guest of Ansar-al-Sunnah and others in Iraq. He was held five days, tortured and threatened with death, all of which is dispassionately described.

Throughout the book, Taylor resists the black and white morality plays often seen in the mainstream media. He refuses to present complex issues in terms of good guys and bad guys. A compelling read, Unembedded also offers nuanced explanations of both the history and multifarious aspects of the many conflicts he has covered.

Orwell in Afghanistan

George Orwell deplored obstufication, lack of clarity and language that serves to obscure not illuminate.

By way of illustration he took this famous verse from Ecclesiastes--“I returned and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all”--and rendered it as, “Objective considerations of contemporary phenomena compel the conclusion that success or failure in competitive activities exhibits no tendency to be commensurate with innate capacity, but that a considerable element of the unpredictable must invariably be taken into account.”

In Afghanistan support for the Karzai government is falling. Resentment against foreign troops and the 'collateral' damage—read killing of civilians—that follows from their increasing reliance on air power and artillery is growing. In an attempt to minimize and rationalize this situation the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO and the Canadian military are resorting to every trick in the book and breaking all of the rules Orwell outlined in 'Politics and the English Language'.

Consider this peripatetic offering from Commander Paula Rowe, Spokesperson for Task Force Helmand. She needed 55 words to say we blame the victims:

The enemy chooses to fight from within local communities, using houses and compounds as firing points and deliberately putting local people in harm’s way. In this case, it was the enemy who began the attacks and the enemy who we hold ultimately responsible for the death of a local man and injury to two others.

In print, with an apology thrown in, it took a mere 52 words (and a typo) to repeat the same thing:

ISAF regrets any injuries caused to civilians. ISAF soldiers are trained to take steps to minimize civilian casualties, whilst at the same time taking appropriate action to protect them selves when threatened. The insurgents however, choose to engage with ISAF within populated areas clearly placing the local Afghan communities at extreme risk of injury.

These comments bear frightening similarities to those made by Israel during their recent assault on Gaza. And to comments heard on playgrounds around the world--'He started it', 'he hit me first', and 'I'm sorry but...'

Often even the media join in these games. The Times of London announces today that President Karzai will be overriding the Afghan Election Commission and not waiting until August to hold the election. Instead it will be held on April 21, less than two months away and a month before Karzai is to step down as president.

This change ensures that Karzai will campaign as the incumbent controlling the security apparatus, the police, and finances. The northern and mountainous regions of Afghanistan that offer little support for Karzai will be snowbound reducing voter turnout. The 'snap' election will also make it impossible for meaningful international monitoring of the election to be organized.

The Times describes the change in soccer terms as if it were merely polite parliamentary shenanigans: An attempt to "wrongfoot his opponents.” It is a bald rigging of the election and, in the language of another English institution, the bookie, 'a royal screwing of the punters'.

Mardi Gras in Afghanistan

Mardi Gras is the culmination of forty days of excess and celebration. Its the doppelganger of Lent a last hurrah before the discipline and deprivation of the forty-six days before Easter. Mardi Gras translates as 'Fat Tuesday' and is fondly known in southern Ontario as 'Pancake' Tuesday as many Christians give up eggs, and in this neck of the woods in days goneby, maple syrup, to symbolize their willingness to share in the sufferings of Christ. In Latin climes it is commonly called Carnival, which literally translates as 'farewell to flesh'.

This year the 'farewell to flesh' theme had a decidedly evil undercurrent. Seven shootings, none yet fatal, occurred on the celebratory 'farewell to flesh' according to the Times-Picayune:

The two most seriously injured victims underwent surgery for stomach wounds, said Officer Janssen Valencia, though he didn't know the men's conditions. The others were listed in stable condition Tuesday night with injuries not considered life-threatening.
The five others suffered less serious wounds, according to police and EMS. They include a 20-month-old boy with a graze wound to the back; a 17-year-old girl shot in the thigh; a 50-year-old woman shot in the elbow; a 15-year-old boy with a graze wound to his back and a 30-year-old man with a graze wound to the thigh.
Dr. Jim Parry, 41, a surgeon at a gathering of doctors near the shooting site, ran over to tend to one man who he said had been shot in the abdomen. Paramedics arrived and took over for the Air Force reservist.
"I'm off to Afghanistan this summer. Damn, this is more dangerous than Afghanistan," Parry said.

Unfortunately, Air Force reservist Dr Jim Parry is wrong, Mardis Gras was much more dangerous in Afghanistan.

The New York Times reports that four American personnel and an Afghan civilian were killed by an IED yesterday:

A roadside bomb killed four United States troops in southern Afghanistan on Tuesday, the United States military said. An Afghan civilian working with the Americans also died. The troops were patrolling with Afghan forces when their vehicle struck a bomb Tuesday afternoon. The four deaths were the most this year for a single attack against international forces in the country.

Meanwhile the Associated Press reports numerous other deaths on Tuesday, February 24:

Afghan soldiers killed 18 militants targeting a poppy eradication force in the country's volatile south, officials said Wednesday. Two soldiers were also killed in the battle ... and two foreign soldiers were wounded in the exchange.
A remote control bomb planted on a motorcycle exploded Wednesday in Kandahar City as a convoy of soldiers. Two Afghan bystanders were killed, and eight people — including five soldiers — were wounded.
Afghan and coalition forces killed 10 militants in Uruzgan province on Tuesday. A "precision" airstrike was called in, killing most of the militants.

Finally, the Canadian Press announced the death yesterday of four-year-old Juma Gul. On Monday she was wounded outside the village of Salehan in the Panjwaii district west of Kandahar along with her twelve-year-old brother and a thirteen-year-old friend. It seems the children were killed by an unexploded round left in the field after Canadian troops conducted ranging and show-of-force exercises outside the village on Sunday. Yesterday, the Canadian forces refused to comment on the incident pending the outcome of an investigation. (More on this story as it develops.)

So you see Dr. Parry, Mardi Gras in New Orleans is not as dangerous as it is in Afghanistan where 'farewell to flesh' has a horribly literal meaning.